If one has one’s Why of life, one can get along with almost any How.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the idols
(quoted in Nick Bostrom, Deep utopia, “Saturday”)
1. Introduction
This is Part 6 of my series, Deep Utopia, discussing Nick Bostrom’s book of the same name. The book is structured around a series of six hypothetical lectures delivered by Bostrom himself on six successive days.
Part 1 discussed the first lecture, Monday. Monday’s lecture explored two inter-linked sets of questions: whether humans might work and earn incomes in the future; and what shape future human population dynamics will take.
Part 2 discussed the second lecture, Tuesday. Tuesday’s lecture discussed our cosmic resource endowment and barriers to reaping the full endowment.
Part 3 discussed the third lecture, Wednesday. Wednesday’s lecture was structured around two versions of the purpose problem of how we might find purpose in a solved world.
Part 4 discussed the fourth lecture, Thursday. Thursday’s lecture asked how a solved world could contain not only purpose but also interestingness.
Part 5 discussed the fifth lecture, Friday. Friday’s lecture discussed fulfillment, richness and purpose.
Today’s post discusses the sixth lecture, Saturday. This 111-page lecture discusses the meaning of life. I’ll outline some main themes from Bostrom’s discussion, then set out major contributions and a few concerns.
2. The meaning of life: Introduction and fundamentality theory
Bostrom suggests that the meaning of life is a grab-bag concept, in that many different and potentially incompatible ideas have become attached to it. This leaves us with two choices.
First, we can take a whole-bag approach, theorizing the grab-bag concept as best we can and owning the potential for conflict and incompatibility. Second, we can take a pick-and-choose approach, pulling out some of the best and most consistent themes and leaving the rest behind.
As an example of the whole-bag approach, Bostrom considers Thaddeus Metz’s account from his book, Meaning in life. Metz defends a fundamentality theory whose third and final formulation is the following:
(FT3) A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs her reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens them, such that the worse parts of her life cause better parts towards its end by a process that makes for a compelling and ideally original life-story; in addition, the meaning in a human person’s life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards fundamental conditions of human existence or exhibits narrative disvalue.
The basic idea of Metz’s fundamentality theory is that life is more meaningful to the extent that we appropriately orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence (the good, the true, and the beautiful). For example, we may spend our lives loving true, good and beautiful things and striving to bring them about.
Metz adds some additional components. In particular, Metz holds that life is more meaningful when it has a good narrative arc, with features such as an upward trajectory and an original story.
On Metz’s fundamentality theory, could lives be meaningful in a solved world? Bostrom suggests that the answer depends on what it means to appropriately orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence.
If appropriate orientation is a matter of loving, valuing, or prioritizing the good, the true, and the beautiful, then utopians are in luck. It would be easy, in a solved world, to bring ourselves to value good, true and beautiful things. The world would be filled with such things, and we would have fewer impediments to a life spent appreciating them.
If, however, appropriate orientation is a matter of bringing about new goodness, truth and beauty, utopians may be out of luck. As the world improves, low-hanging fruit is plucked and opportunities to bring about good, true and beautiful things may be harder to come by.
For similar reasons, Bostrom suggests, utopians find it difficult to bring about the narrative structure that Metz demands. It is hard to induce an upward trajectory in an already-excellent life, or an original life story in a universe where so many lives have already been lived.
Perhaps, Bostrom suggests, we should not give up hope. A solved world may offer plenty of rich narrative opportunities and opportunities to bring about new good, true and beautiful things that we cannot grasp from our own limited perspective. But we may also want to look for a new theory of the meaning of life, adopting the pick-and-choose approach rather than the whole-bag approach.
3. Six observations
To motivate a new theory of the meaning of life, Bostrom makes six observations.
First, threats to meaning in life arise especially for those with slack: a relatively large amount to forfeit or lose. It is the leisure class, and not the working class that is most directly struck by crises of meaning.
Second, it may be sufficient for meaning that we occupy a role we believe is worth devoting ourselves to, and which fills a good chunk of our lives.
Third, meaning involves an orientation towards the big picture of our lives.
Fourth, meaning exhibits enchantment, being enriched when it is enmeshed in a tapestry of rich symbolic experience.
Fifth, the meaning of life may be something like a life motto that we can get behind.
Sixth, meaning motivates effort without much expenditure of willpower. For those blessed with a meaningful life, work is easy.
4. A new theory
To capture these observations, Bostrom adopts a theory of meaning as encompassing transcendent purpose (ETP).
Meaning as encompassing transcendent purpose (ETP): Purpose P is the meaning of person S‘s life if and only if:
- P is encompassing for S.
- S has strong reason to embrace P.
- This reason is derived from a context of justification that is external to S’s mundane experience.
For Bostrom, a purpose is encompassing to the extent that it makes a sustained demand on a wide range of our faculties. This captures Bostrom’s second observation, on which a purpose conveys meaning to the extent that it takes up a good chunk of our lives. Reading the Tuesday newspaper can only bring so much meaning to life, because it only takes up an hour on Tuesday. But collecting and cataloging world newspapers could bring greater meaning, because it could occupy a good chunk of your time and faculties.
Not any encompassing purpose will do. Kicking enough puppies could be an encompassing purpose, but a life spent kicking puppies would not be meaningful. This is the point of the second clause: the purpose must be one we have a strong reason to embrace.
Not any encompassing purpose which we have strong reason to embrace will do. Consider a medieval serf who spends every day toiling in the fields to earn a subsistence living. This is not an especially meaningful life. Bostrom’s diagnosis is that the serf’s life lacks meaning because her reason for toil is internal to her mundane existence, related to the fulfillment of everyday needs. A truly transcendent purpose should be one which we have strong reason external to our mundane existence for embracing.
5. Further discussion
From this point on, the discussion is a bit scattered. Readers expecting an extended elaboration and defense of the ETP view are going to come away from this chapter disappointed.
Bostrom notes that the ETP view can be read on a spectrum from subjective to objective purpose by varying the way that clauses (2) and (3) are posed. A fully objective ETP view treats transcendent purposes as those we actually have strong reason for, where that reason actually lies outside the context of justification of our mundane existence. A more subjective ETP view treats transcendent purposes as those we believe we have strong reason for, where that reason is believed to lie outside the context of justification of our mundane existence.
Bostrom suggests that it may be possible for many of us to have a shared purpose, grounding meaningful lives for those who have it. This would happen when:
(Transcendent Instrumental Considerations) There is a transcendental context of instrumental considerations that has a particularly definite set of implications for a sufficiently wide range of possible preferences.
The meaning of life could then be determined by our macrostrategic situation: structural features of the world and the location of our agency in relation to them.
To make this suggestion more concrete, suppose that utopia were just around the corner, and all that was needed to get there was a global push to build transformative artificial intelligence. In this situation, most human preferences would give their bearers an instrumental reason to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the advancement of artificial intelligence. In this way, transcendent instrumental considerations (how artificial intelligence would bring about the satisfaction of our goals) would give us a meaningful project (building artificial intelligence) because of the structure of the world and our agency in it (we’re close to building transformative artificial intelligence, and we can help to build it).
More broadly, Bostrom discusses three categories of possible meanings that could be widely shared: reward (such as utopia or divine blessing), morality, and zeal where “the reasons for us to embrace them are instead based on some evaluative disposition we have toward something that is more integral to the purpose itself.” For example, we might devote ourselves to the cause of ending extreme poverty or the identity of being a world-leading scientist.
6. Wrap-up
The book ends with a direct refusal to specify the meaning of life, a graveyard tour, a carnival and a poetry slam. A disguised Bostrom makes an appearance, regaling his listeners with what appear to be his career plans:
OLD SEAMEN
and once more to sea!
this ancient schooner
yet has another sea-ride
in its rotting planks
the mast can still hold loft a sail!
and these my weathered hands
though less dexterous than afore
have the more experience
know their way with hook and tackle
and soon will heave unto the deck
a thrashing tuna
and with a grin the inveterate ocean-robber
will stuff a pipe and regard the final trophy by his side
and then the horizon
and the salty waves
which he will leave to younger men—
before laying up for good at port
to sit by the pane and foghorns’ bellow
The listeners breathe the warm summer air, and the book ends.
7. Contributions
Saturday’s lecture does make two philosophically important contributions. The first is a negative contribution: the critique of Metz. Bostrom gives good reasons for concern about some of the features tacked on to Metz’s account. In particular, Bostrom argues, Metz may place too much emphasis on narrative as an element of a meaningful life. And it is not clear why Metz should need or want to incorporate his additional clause on which lives are made less meaningful, as opposed to merely failing to be made more meaningful, by inappropriate orientations towards the good, the true and the beautiful.
The second is a positive contribution: the encompassing transcendent purpose account of meaning. Giving a positive account of the meaning of life is a difficult philosophical project, and this is not the worst positive view on the subject that has been offered.
8. Concerns
8.1. Fixing the subject of discussion
Wittgenstein taught us that many philosophical discussions go wrong because we do not spend enough time at the outset making sure that there is something we are talking about, and that we know what it is.
Many philosophers think that questions about the meaning of life are ill-formed, and nearly all think they are deeply unclear, so one would expect Bostrom to have done a good deal of work at the outset to clarify his subject. This is doubly true because Bostrom has, by this point, any number of related normative concepts floating around: purpose, interestingness, fulfillment, richness, and meaning. Here there is a particular danger of running together different concepts, of theorizing the same concept under different names, or of importing intuitions about one concept in theorizing about another.
Bostrom assures his readers very quickly that we must think questions about the meaning of life are well-formed, since we can all recognize some answers to those questions to be bad answers. For example, “love” is a poor answer to the meaning of life.
This is not convincing. Ill-formed questions are often coherent enough that we can recognize some answers as worse than others. If I ask you which beings can create a rock so large that no being can lift it, “my dog” is a worse answer than “God,” even if the question turns out to be ill-formed. It is also not very reassuring. To hear that we can sometimes identify some answers to a question as poor is not to say that we have any especially good handle on the subject.
Finally, it avoids the burden that Bostrom is supposed to be fulfilling: telling us, in positive terms, what he means by the meaning of life, how it relates to the other concepts he is theorizing, and why (beyond a bit of bare intelligibility) we should think there is such a thing.
Most philosophers will come to this discussion thinking that the motivating question of the chapter is ill-formed. I don’t see much in this chapter that will convince them to change that view.
8.2. Motivating the ETP view
Bostrom does an excellent job rigorously stating the encompassing transcendent purpose (ETP) view. He does a less good job motivating the view.
The ETP view is motivated by a set of six observations about slack, roles, orientation, enchantment, mottos, and motivating effort. These observations are cursory, not deeply argued, and not always clearly stated. More to the point, they play an especially sparse role in motivating the ETP view, which is shown only very briefly to capture some thoughts in the spirit of these observations.
Here, for example, is how Bostrom wields the first three observations in support of the ETP view:
Because the meaning-giving purpose is encompassing, it has the capacity to absorb a great amount of slack that one might otherwise have in one’s life.
Because the purpose need not be outcome-oriented, it allows for the possibility of finding meaning in a role (or in a commitment to an ideal).
Because having a meaning involves pursuing a purpose that is derived from a transcendental context of justification, it requires and provides some orientation with respect to the most important and relevant aspects of the macrostrategic situation of our lives.
This kind of cursory support will not suffice to pick out the ETP view from many competitors. For example, Metz’s fundamentality theory also allows purposes to be orienting towards what matters (the true, the good and the beautiful). We can find this purpose in a role, and indeed Metz offers three paradigm examples: an activist (Mandela), a scientist (Einstein) and a novelist (Dostoevsky). And as their lives illustrate, a great deal of slack can be taken up in pursuing the good, the true, and the beautiful, any of which can occupy a full and rich life.
If Bostrom wants to make a detailed philosophical case for the ETP view, he really needs to do better than this. This is not the level of detail or rigor at which one expects a leading philosopher to argue.
8.3. Concluding the book
Readers may be forgiven for having expected this book to be written primarily for their benefit. In the last portion of his lecture, Bostrom poses the question to which his readers have been looking to hear the answer:
With this groundwork laid, we are now ready to emplace our positive answer to the question: the question of what is—at least for most of us, and perhaps for all human beings currently alive—the meaning of life.
But the answer never comes. Bostrom is whisked away by a dean, and the book concludes with a poetry slam in which Bostrom tells the reader about the next chapter of his life.
This isn’t the first failure to consider readers. The first failure was writing a book so long that very few readers wanted to read it. But it is perhaps the most striking failure. If the book is about finding meaning in a solved world, it should end with some remarks about meaning in a solved world. Those could be remarks about meaning in life, or a general attempt to tie the book together.
Instead, the book ends with a disguised Bostrom telling readers how this old seaman has one last voyage left before he lays up in port to hear the foghorns’ bellow. This is the way to end a book about Nick Bostrom. It is not a good way to end a book about meaning in a solved world. That is, after all, meant to be the subject of the book, is it not?
9. Conclusion
Deep utopia is quite a journey. Despite its length, it contains some important reflections on the future of work, the nature of meaning and purpose, and how they might be found in a solved world. And it makes some original philosophical contributions along the way.
The book also contains a good many puzzling anecdotes, unnecessary tangents, unclear concepts, under-argued views, and lackluster upshots for the central questions of the book.
I don’t think that Deep utopia is as poorly organized or poorly reasoned as many have claimed. And despite its length, I am not entirely unhappy to have read the book. But this is far from Bostrom’s best work. I am not sure that I can recommend, in good conscience, that others read it in full.

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