Tag: Exaggerating the risks
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 22: AI 2027 recap)
This post draws lessons from our discussion of the AI 2027 report.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 21: AI 2027 takeoff forecast)
The AI 2027 takeoff forecast predicts the arrival of superintelligence a year after superhuman coders arrive. I have my doubts.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 20: AI 2027 timelines forecast, benchmarks and gaps)
The second part of the AI 2027 timelines model relies primarily on insufficiently evidenced forecasts.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 19: AI 2027 timelines forecast, time horizon extension)
The AI 2027 report relies on two models of AI timelines. The first timelines model largely bakes hyperbolic growth into the model structure.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 18: Introduction to AI 2027)
This post introduces the AI 2027 report.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 17: Biorisk, taking stock)
This post concludes my sub-series on existential biorisk by drawing lessons from the previous discussion
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 16: Biorisk from LLMs, continued)
This post continues my investigation of biorisk from LLMs by looking at a recent redteaming study from the RAND Corporation.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 15: Biorisk from LLMs)
This post begins a two-part investigation into biorisk from LLMs. I argue that a recent GovAI report provides limited support for existential biorisk from LLMs.
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Exaggerating the risks (Part 14: MacAskill on biorisk)
I review Wlil MacAskill’s arguments in What we owe the future for high levels of existential biorisk. I argue that they are insufficient.